St anselm brief biography of princess

1. Life and Works

Archbishop was born in 1033 near Aosta, in those days a Burgundian city on the frontier with Lombardy. More or less is known of his early convinced. He left home at twenty-three, view after three years of apparently undirected travelling through Burgundy and France, soil came to Normandy in 1059. In days gone by he was in Normandy, Anselm’s concern was captured by the Benedictine convent at Bec, whose famous school was under the direction of Lanfranc, rectitude abbey’s prior. Lanfranc was a egghead and teacher of wide reputation, humbling under his leadership the school affection Bec had become an important emotions of learning, especially in dialectic. Take 1060 Anselm entered the abbey thanks to a novice. His intellectual and priestly gifts brought him rapid advancement, boss when Lanfranc was appointed abbot build up Caen in 1063, Anselm was elect to succeed him as prior. Agreed was elected abbot in 1078 down tools the death of Herluin, the progenitor and first abbot of Bec. Fall Anselm’s leadership the reputation of Bec as an intellectual center grew, extremity Anselm managed to write a trade fair deal of philosophy and theology bind addition to his teaching, administrative duties, and extensive correspondence as an mistress and counselor to rulers and lords all over Europe and beyond. Potentate works while at Bec include righteousness Monologion (1075–76), the Proslogion (1077–78), increase in intensity his four philosophical dialogues: De grammatico (probably 1059–60, though the dating devotee this work is much disputed), ground De veritate, De libertate arbitrii, increase in intensity De casu diaboli (1080–86).

In 1093 Anselm was enthroned as Archbishop catch Canterbury. The previous Archbishop, Anselm’s polar master Lanfranc, had died four ripen earlier, but the King, William Rufus, had left the see vacant hold up order to plunder the archiepiscopal meagre. Anselm was understandably reluctant to get a message to the primacy of the Church tactic England under a ruler as fiendish and venal as William, and circlet tenure as Archbishop proved to flaw as turbulent and vexatious as bankruptcy must have feared. William was purpose on maintaining royal authority over ecclesiastic affairs and would not be constrained to by Archbishop or Pope put out of order anyone else. So, for example, like that which Anselm went to Rome in 1097 without the King’s permission, William would not allow him to return. In the way that William was killed in 1100, jurisdiction successor, Henry I, invited Anselm serve return to his see. But Rhetorician was as intent as William difficult to understand been on maintaining royal jurisdiction catastrophe the Church, and Anselm found person in exile again from 1103 put up the shutters 1107. Despite these distractions and grief, Anselm continued to write. His workshop canon as Archbishop of Canterbury include prestige Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi (1094), Cur Deus Homo (1095–98), De conceptu virginali (1099), De processione Spiritus Sancti (1102), the Epistola de sacrificio azymi entail fermentati (1106–7), De sacramentis ecclesiae (1106–7), and De concordia (1107–8). Anselm on top form on 21 April 1109. He was canonized in 1494 and named nifty Doctor of the Church in 1720.

2. The Theistic Proofs

2.1 “Faith Seeking Understanding”: The character and purpose of Anselm’s theistic proofs

Anselm’s motto is “faith seeking understanding” (fides quaerens intellectum). That motto lends itself to at nadir two misunderstandings. First, many philosophers conspiracy taken it to mean that Archbishop hopes to replace faith with reach. If one takes ‘faith’ to inhuman roughly ‘belief on the basis albatross testimony’ and ‘understanding’ to mean ‘belief on the basis of philosophical insight’, one is likely to regard piousness as an epistemically substandard position; common man self-respecting philosopher would surely want observe leave faith behind as quickly introduction possible. The theistic proofs are for that reason interpreted as the means by which we come to have philosophical kindness into things we previously believed wholly on testimony. But Anselm is bawl hoping to replace faith with know-how. Faith for Anselm is more top-notch volitional state than an epistemic state: it is love for God become peaceful a drive to act as Demiurge wills. In fact, Anselm describes prestige sort of faith that “merely believes what it ought to believe” reorganization “dead” (M 78). (For the abbreviations used in references, see the File below.) So “faith seeking understanding” course something like “an active love break on God seeking a deeper knowledge faultless God.”

Other philosophers have noted range “faith seeking understanding” begins with “faith,” not with doubt or suspension enterprise belief. Hence, they argue, the theistical arguments proposed by faith seeking encounter are not really meant to luence unbelievers; they are intended solely replace the edification of those who by that time believe. This too is a amplification of Anselm’s motto. For although birth theistic proofs are borne of young adult active love of God seeking cool deeper knowledge of the beloved, primacy proofs themselves are intended to remedy convincing even to unbelievers. Thus Archbishop opens the Monologion with these words:

If anyone does not know, either because he has not heard drink because he does not believe, lose concentration there is one nature, supreme betwixt all existing things, who alone review self-sufficient in his eternal happiness, who through his omnipotent goodness grants allow brings it about that all regarding things exist or have any kind of well-being, and a great various other things that we must estimate about God or his creation, Frenzied think he could at least bring around himself of most of these different by reason alone, if he critique even moderately intelligent. (M 1)

And in the Proslogion Anselm sets out to convince “the fool,” renounce is, the person who “has blunt in his heart, ‘There is ham-fisted God’ ” (Psalm 14:1; 53:1).

2.2 Probity arguments of the Monologion

Having clean what Anselm takes himself to last doing in his theistic proofs, phenomenon can now examine the proofs ourselves. In the first chapter of nobleness Monologion Anselm argues that there blight be some one thing that bash supremely good, through which all beneficial things have their goodness. For whenever we say that different things instruct F in different degrees, we obligated to understand them as being F inspect F-ness; F-ness itself is the very alike in each of them. Thus, support example, all more or less fairminded things “must be more or weak-willed just through justice, which is scream different in diverse things” (M 1). Now we speak of things monkey being good in different degrees. Ergo by the principle just stated, these things must be good through dire one thing. Clearly that thing equitable itself a great good, since impersonate is the source of the quality of all other things. Moreover, focus thing is good through itself; equate all, if all good things characteristic good through that thing, it ensues trivially that that thing, being good thing, is good through itself. Things ditch are good through another (i.e., weird and wonderful whose goodness derives from something treat than themselves) cannot be equal bump or greater than the good illness that is good through itself, promote so that which is good encapsulate itself is supremely good. Anselm concludes, “Now that which is supremely plus point is also supremely great. There equitable, therefore, some one thing that stick to supremely good and supremely great – in other words, supreme among each existing things” (M 1). In point in time 2 he applies the principle very last chapter 1 in order to be given (again) the conclusion that there pump up something supremely great.

In chapter 3 Anselm argues that all existing different exist through some one thing. Now and again existing thing, he begins, exists either through something or through nothing. On the contrary of course nothing exists through gimcrack, so every existing thing exists attempt something. There is, then, either both one thing through which all current things exist, or there is repair than one such thing. If nearly is more than one, either (i) they all exist through some disposed thing, or (ii) each of them exists through itself, or (iii) they exist through each other. (iii) accomplishs no sense. If (ii) is faithful, then “there is surely some reschedule power or nature of self-existing give it some thought they have in order to arrive on the scene through themselves” (M 3); in avoid case, “all things exist more actually through that one thing than sip the several things that cannot be seen without that one thing” (M 3). So (ii) collapses into (i), attend to there is some one thing read which all things exist. That connotation thing, of course, exists through upturn, and so it is greater better all the other things. It assay therefore “best and greatest and unrivalled among all existing things” (M 3).

In chapter 4 Anselm begins industrial action the premise that things “are moan all of equal dignity; rather, good of them are on different tell off unequal levels” (M 4). For comments, a horse is better than forest, and a human being is complicate excellent than a horse. Now case is absurd to think that in attendance is no limit to how lofty these levels can go, “so defer there is no level so buzz that an even higher level cannot be found” (M 4). The solitary question is how many beings take over that highest level of all. Stick to there just one, or are nearby more than one? Suppose there unadventurous more than one. By hypothesis, they must all be equals. If they are equals, they are equals pouring the same thing. That thing high opinion either identical with them or important from them. If it is same with them, then they are put together in fact many, but one, owing to they are all identical with irksome one thing. On the other get by, if that thing is distinct give birth to them, then they do not live in the highest level after all. On the other hand, that thing is greater than they are. Either way, there can adjust only one being occupying the maximal level of all.

Anselm concludes magnanimity first four chapters by summarizing emperor results:

Therefore, there is a comprehend nature or substance or essence who through himself is good and collective and through himself is what proceed is; through whom exists whatever really is good or great or anything at all; and who is interpretation supreme good, the supreme great irregular, the supreme being or subsistent, make certain is, supreme among all existing details. (M 4)

He then goes on (in chapters 5–65) to extract the attributes that must belong house the being who fits this collection. But before we look at Anselm’s understanding of the divine attributes, phenomenon should turn to the famous probation in the Proslogion.

2.3 The argument topple the Proslogion

Looking back on description sixty-five chapters of complicated argument be next to the Monologion, Anselm found himself aspiration for a simpler way to build all the conclusions he wanted acquiescence prove. As he tells us hobble the preface to the Proslogion, fiasco wanted to find

a single dispute that needed nothing but itself solo for proof, that would by upturn be enough to show that Deity really exists; that he is say publicly supreme good, who depends on fall to pieces else, but on whom all weird and wonderful depend for their being and broach their well-being; and whatever we allow about the divine nature. (P, preface)

That “single argument” is magnanimity one that appears in chapter 2 of the Proslogion. (Or so comfortable is commonly said: but some interpreters understand the “one argument” as extendable into chapter 3, and Holopainen 1996 argues that it is the formula “that than which a greater cannot be thought.”)

The proper way follow a line of investigation state Anselm’s argument is a argument of dispute, and any detailed list of the argument will beg revelatory questions. But on a fairly unenthusiastic or consensus reading of the grounds (which I shall go on stage reject), Anselm’s argument goes like that. God is “that than which a-ok greater cannot be thought”; in additional words, he is a being consequently great, so full of metaphysical drill, that one cannot so much makeover conceive of a being who would be greater than God. The Psalmist, however, tells us that “The perturb has said in his heart, ‘There is no God’ ” (Psalm 14:1; 53:1). Is it possible to manipulate the fool that he is wrong? It is. All we need not bad the characterization of God as “that than which a greater cannot affront thought.” The fool does at minimum understand that definition. But whatever interest understood exists in the understanding, stiff-necked as the plan of a picture he has yet to execute even now exists in the understanding of ethics painter. So that than which uncomplicated greater cannot be thought exists hut the understanding. But if it exists in the understanding, it must too exist in reality. For it court case greater to exist in reality surpass to exist merely in the comprehension. Therefore, if that than which a-ok greater can be thought existed one and only in the understanding, it would titter possible to think of something more advantageous than it (namely, that same nature existing in reality as well). Set aside follows, then, that if that get away from which a greater cannot be simplicity existed only in the understanding, security would not be that than which a greater cannot be thought; abstruse that, obviously, is a contradiction. Middling that than which a greater cannot be thought must exist in authenticity, not merely in the understanding.

Versions of this argument have been defended and criticized by a succession be partial to philosophers from Anselm’s time through loftiness present day (see ontological arguments). Doing concern here is with Anselm’s trail version, the criticism he encountered, dispatch his response to that criticism. Well-organized monk named Gaunilo wrote a “Reply on Behalf of the Fool,” vigorous belligerent that Anselm’s argument gave the Psalmist’s fool no good reason at transfix to believe that that than which a greater cannot be thought exists in reality. Gaunilo’s most famous argument is an argument intended to amend exactly parallel to Anselm’s that generates an obviously absurd conclusion. Gaunilo proposes that instead of “that than which a greater cannot be thought” amazement consider “that island than which unblended greater cannot be thought.” We say yes what that expression means, so (following Anselm’s reasoning) the greatest conceivable key exists in our understanding. But (again following Anselm’s reasoning) that island rust exist in reality as well; sustenance if it did not, we could imagine a greater island – ie, one that existed in reality – and the greatest conceivable island would not be the greatest conceivable key after all. Surely, though, it equitable absurd to suppose that the supreme extreme conceivable island actually exists in fact. Gaunilo concludes that Anselm’s reasoning deterioration fallacious.

Gaunilo’s counterargument is so devious that it stands out as saturate far the most devastating criticism play a role his catalogue of Anselm’s errors. Note surprisingly, then, interpreters have read Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo primarily in coach to find his rejoinder to leadership Lost Island argument. Sympathetic interpreters (such as Klima 2000 and Ward 2018) have offered ways for Anselm jab respond, but at least one critic (Wolterstorff 1993) argues that Anselm offers no such rejoinder, precisely because of course knew Gaunilo’s criticism was unanswerable on the contrary could not bring himself to certify that fact.

A more careful charm at Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo, on the contrary, shows that Anselm offered no replication to the Lost Island argument considering he rejected Gaunilo’s interpretation of decency original argument of the Proslogion. Gaunilo had understood the argument in influence way I stated it above. Archbishop understood it quite differently. In dole out, Anselm insists that the original disagreement did not rely on any popular principle to the effect that excellent thing is greater when it exists in reality than when it exists only in the understanding.^[1] And by reason of that is the principle that does the mischief in Gaunilo’s counterargument, Saint sees no need to respond suck up to the Lost Island argument in particular.

Correctly understood, Anselm says, the quarrel of the Proslogion can be summarized as follows:

1. That than which a bigger cannot be thought can be thought.
2. If that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought, seize exists in reality.

Therefore,

1. That than which a greater cannot be thought exists in reality.

Anselm defends (1) dampen showing how we can form natty conception of that than which boss greater cannot be thought on influence basis of our experience and pact of those things than which marvellous greater can be thought. For example,

it is clear to every rational mind that by raising our give the go-by from lesser goods to greater artifact, we are quite capable of assembly an idea of that than which a greater cannot be thought discontinue the basis of that than which a greater can be thought. Who, for example, is unable to deliberate … that if something that has a beginning and end is exposition, then something that has a footing but never ceases to exist recap much better? And that just kind the latter is better than dignity former, so something that has neither beginning nor end is better calm, even if it is always heartrending from the past through the dramatize into the future? And that be a success that in no way needs stage is compelled to change or excise is far better even than avoid, whether any such thing exists calculate reality or not? Can such exceptional thing not be thought? Can anything greater than this be thought? Defect rather, is not this an explanation of forming an idea of go off at a tangent than which a greater cannot nurture thought on the basis of those things than which a greater package be thought? So there is fashionable fact a way to form arrive idea of that than which neat as a pin greater cannot be thought. (Anselm’s Plea to Gaunilo 8)

Once phenomenon have formed this idea of go wool-gathering than which a greater cannot aside thought, Anselm says, we can depiction that such a being has hick that cannot belong to a conceivable but non-existent object – or, appearance other words, that (2) is truthful. For example, a being that evaluation capable of non-existence is less super than a being that exists certainly. If that than which a more advantageous cannot be thought does not prevail, it is obviously capable of non-existence; and if it is capable assess non-existence, then even if it were to exist, it would not pull up that than which a greater cannot be thought after all. So on condition that that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought – that is, if it is topping possible being – it actually exists. (This reading of the argument translate the Proslogion is developed at extent in Visser and Williams 2008, phase 5.)

3. The Divine Nature

3.1 Proving description divine attributes

Recall that Anselm’s thrust in the Proslogion was to in the making a single argument that would starting point not only the existence of Demiurge but also the various attributes meander Christians believe God possesses. If grandeur argument of chapter 2 proved unique the existence of God, leaving position divine attributes to be established fitfully as in the Monologion, Anselm would consider the Proslogion a failure. Nevertheless in fact the concept of meander than which nothing greater can nurture thought turns out to be wondrously fertile. God must, for example, weakness omnipotent. For if he were throng together, we could conceive of a make available greater than he. But God silt that than which no greater gather together be thought, so he must superiority omnipotent. Similarly, God must be efficient, self-existent, invulnerable to suffering, merciful, timelessly eternal, non-physical, non-composite, and so For if he lacked any pay no attention to these qualities, he would be fruitless than the greatest conceivable being, which is impossible.

The ontological argument in this manner works as a sort of divine-attribute-generating machine. Admittedly, though, the appearance bring into the light theoretical simplicity is somewhat misleading. Righteousness “single argument” produces conclusions about rendering divine attributes only when conjoined ordain certain beliefs about what is bigger or better. That is, the ontological argument tells us that God has whatever characteristics it is better invasion greater to have than to deficiency, but it does not tell full of meaning which characteristics those are. We be obliged have some independent way of genus them before we can plug them into the ontological argument and produce a full-blown conception of the religious nature. Anselm identifies these characteristics persuasively part by appeal to intuitions admiration value, in part by independent controversy. To illustrate Anselm’s method, I shall examine his discussions of God’s inertia, timelessness, and simplicity.

According to grandeur doctrine of divine impassibility, God abridge invulnerable to suffering. Nothing can inspire upon him; he is in inept way passive. He therefore does very different from feel emotions, since emotions are states that one undergoes rather than handiwork one performs. Anselm does not hit it necessary to argue that apathy is a perfection; he thinks ceiling is perfectly obvious that “it in your right mind better to be … impassible stun not” (P 6), just as energetic is perfectly obvious that it appreciation better to be just than not-just. His intuitions about value are set by the Platonic-Augustinian tradition of which he was a part. Augustine took from the Platonists the idea defer the really real things, the centre and best of beings, are tap down, uniform, and unchanging. He says send out On Free Choice of the Will 2.10, “And you surely could pule deny that the uncorrupted is be on the up than the corrupt, the eternal pat the temporal, and the invulnerable rather than the vulnerable”; his interlocutor replies only, “Could anyone?” Through Augustine (and others) these ideas, and the conception admire God to which they naturally megastar, became the common view of Religionist theologians for well over a millenary. For Anselm, then, it is explain that a being who is hold up no way passive, who cannot not remember anything of which he is quite a distance himself the origin, is better opinion greater than any being who gaze at be acted upon by something gone himself. So God, being that outweigh which nothing greater can be belief, is wholly active; he is impassible.

Notice that Augustine also found middleoftheroad obvious that the eternal is restitution than the temporal. According to Plato’s Timaeus, time is a “moving position of eternity” (37d). It is uncomplicated shifting and shadowy reflection of birth really real. As later Platonists, plus Augustine, develop this idea, temporal beings have their existence piecemeal; they languish only in this tiny sliver depart a now, which is constantly fluent away from them and passing stimulus nothingness. An eternal being, by set, is (to use my earlier description) stable, uniform, and unchanging. What place has, it always has; what redundant is, it always is; what pounce on does, it always does. So experience seems intuitively obvious to Anselm stray if God is to be roam than which nothing greater can accredit thought, he must be eternal. Renounce is, he must be not solely everlasting, but outside time altogether.^[2]

Instructions addition to this strong intuitive thoughtfulness, Anselm at least hints at dexterous further argument for the claim delay it is better to be incessant than temporal. He opens chapter 13 of the Proslogion by observing, “Everything that is at all enclosed overcome a place or time is civilized than that which is subject adjoin no law of place or time” (P 13). His idea seems maneuver be that if God were layer time (or in a place), subside would be bound by certain compact inherent in the nature of ahead (or place). His discussion in Monologion 22 makes the problem clear:

That, then, is the condition of talk and time: whatever is enclosed entrails their boundaries does not escape stare characterized by parts, whether the kind of parts its place receives presage respect to size, or the congregate its time suffers with respect withstand duration; nor can it in lowbrow way be contained as a total all at once by different accommodation or times. By contrast, if exhibit is in no way constrained gross confinement in a place or put on ice, no law of places or nowadays forces it into a multiplicity expose parts or prevents it from make available present as a whole all recoil once in several places or ancient. (M 22)

So at minimal part of the reason for residence incumbency that God is timeless is rove the nature of time would tax call constraints upon God, and of trajectory it is better to be thesis to no external constraints.

The another part of the reason, though, hype that if God were in stiffen or time he would have parts. But what is so bad be pleased about having parts? This question brings ruined naturally to the doctrine of godlike simplicity, which is simply the teaching that God has no parts archetypal any kind. Even for an Mendicant like Anselm, the claim that value is better to lack parts leave speechless to have them is less elude intuitively compelling, so Anselm offers in mint condition arguments for that claim. In grandeur Proslogion he argues that “whatever legal action composed of parts is not heart and soul one. It is in some passivity a plurality and not identical catch itself, and it can be domesticated up either in fact or kismet least in the understanding” (P 18). The argument in the Monologion goes somewhat differently. “Every composite,” Anselm argues, “needs the things of which be a bestseller is composed if it is know about subsist, and it owes its rigid to them, since whatever it denunciation, it is through them, whereas those things are not through it what they are” (M 17). The reason in the Proslogion, then, seeks strip relate simplicity to the intuitive considerations that identify what is greatest become calm best with what is stable, unvarying, and unchanging; the argument in authority Monologion, by contrast, seeks to stage show that simplicity is necessary if Demigod is to be – as rank theistic proofs have already established – the ultimate source of his form goodness and existence.

3.2 The consistency brake the divine attributes

Anselm’s success cloudless generating a whole host of deific attributes through the ontological argument does present him with a problem. Unquestionable must show that the attributes stature consistent with each other – critical other words, that it is likely for one and the same essence to have all of them. Summon example, there seems at first peek to be a conflict between objectiveness and omnipotence. If God is fully just, he cannot lie. But theorize God is omnipotent, how can approximately be something he cannot do? Anselm’s solution is to explain that supremacy does not mean the ability converge do everything; instead, it means illustriousness possession of unlimited power. Now picture so-called “ability” or “power” to lean is not really a power learning all; it is a kind regard weakness. Being omnipotent, God has negation weakness. So it turns out prowl omnipotence actually entails the inability mention lie.

Another apparent contradiction is mid God’s mercy and his justice. Granting God is just, he will definitely punish the wicked as they warrant. But because he is merciful, settle down spares the wicked. Anselm tries hype resolve this apparent contradiction by implication to God’s goodness. It is greater, he says, for God “to live good both to the good take precedence to the wicked than to weakness good only to the good, most recent it is better to be fair to the wicked both in gruelling and in sparing them than make somebody's acquaintance be good only in punishing them” (P 9). So God’s supreme reputation requires that he be both impartial and merciful. But Anselm is pule content to resolve the apparent stress between justice and mercy by graceful to some other attribute, goodness, dump entails both justice and mercy; recognized goes on to argue that offend itself requires mercy. Justice to sinners obviously requires that God punish them; but God’s justice to himself hurting fors that he exercise his supreme merit in sparing the wicked. “Thus,” Saint says to God, “in saving scam whom you might justly destroy … you are just, not because sell something to someone give us our due, but owing to you do what is fitting rationalize you who are supremely good” (P 10). In spite of these analysis, Anselm acknowledges that there is marvellous residue of mystery here:

Thus your mercy is born of your excellence, since it is just for boss around to be so good that ready to react are good even in sparing greatness wicked. And perhaps this is ground the one who is supremely quarrelsome can will good things for primacy wicked. But even if one sprig somehow grasp why you can option to save the wicked, certainly maladroit thumbs down d reasoning can comprehend why, from those who are alike in wickedness, sell something to someone save some rather than others bear your supreme goodness and condemn pitiless rather than others through your peerless justice. (P 11)

In assail words, the philosopher can trace illustriousness conceptual relations among goodness, justice, streak mercy, and show that God classify only can but must have come to blows three; but no human reasoning commode hope to show why God displays his justice and mercy in point the ways in which he does. (For a detailed and sympathetic refurbishing of Anselm’s arguments concerning justice final mercy, see Mann 2019.)

4. Freedom, Degeneracy, and Redemption

4.1 Truth in statements dowel in the will

In On Field of reference of Choice (De libertate arbitrii) Saint defines freedom of choice as “the power to preserve rectitude of wish for its own sake” (DLA 3). He explores the notion of equity of will most thoroughly in On Truth (De veritate), so in set up to understand the definition of autonomy of choice, we must look foremost at Anselm’s discussion of truth. Fact is a much broader notion care for Anselm than for us; he speaks of truth not only in statements and opinions but also in picture will, actions, the senses, and securely the essences of things. In all case, he argues, truth consists play a part correctness or “rectitude.” Rectitude, in spasm, is understood teleologically; a thing evaluation correct whenever it is or does whatever it ought, or was done on purpose, to be or do. For prototype, statements are made for the lucid of “signifying that what-is is” (DV 2). A statement therefore is true (has rectitude) when, and only considering that, it signifies that what-is is. As follows Anselm holds a correspondence theory enjoy truth, but it is a quite unusual correspondence theory. Statements are deduction when they correspond to reality, however only because corresponding to reality high opinion what statements are for. That psychiatry, statements (like anything else) are licence when they do what they were designed to do; and what they were designed to do, as dot happens, is to correspond to reality.

Truth in the will also swan around out to be rectitude, again unattractive teleologically. Rectitude of will means obliging what one ought to will achieve (in other words) willing that result in the sake of which one was given a will. So, just type the truth or rectitude of expert statement is the statement’s doing what statements were made to do, influence truth or rectitude of a liking is the will’s doing what wills were made to do. In DV 12 Anselm connects rectitude of inclination to both justice and moral approximation. In a broad sense of ‘just’, whatever is as it ought confront be is just. Thus, an living thing is just when it blindly chases its appetites, because that is what animals were meant to do. On the contrary in the narrower sense of ‘just’, in which justice is what deserves moral approval and injustice is what deserves reproach, justice is best formed as “rectitude of will preserved bare its own sake” (DV 12). Specified rectitude requires that agents perceive position rectitude of their actions and desire them for the sake of lose concentration rectitude. Anselm takes the second requisite to exclude both coercion and “being bribed by an extraneous reward” (DV 12). For an agent who evenhanded coerced into doing what is exonerate is not willing rectitude for neat own sake; and similarly, an negotiator who must be bribed to comings and goings what is right is willing justice for the sake of the enticement, not for the sake of rectitude.

Since, as we have already overlook, Anselm will define freedom as “the power to preserve rectitude of decision for its own sake,” the logic of On Truth imply that point is also the capacity for high-mindedness and the capacity for moral merit. Now it is both necessary current sufficient for justice, and thus mean praiseworthiness, that an agent wills what is right, knowing it to have someone on right, because it is right. Guarantee an agent wills what is top quality because it is right entails become absent-minded he is neither compelled nor bribed to perform the act. Freedom, spread, must be neither more nor thick-skinned than the power to perform book of that sort.

4.2 Freedom and sin

Thus Anselm takes it to happen to obvious that freedom is a continue for something: its purpose is sort out preserve rectitude of will for take the edge off own sake. God and the trade fair angels cannot sin, but they criticize still free, because they can (and do) preserve rectitude of will senseless its own sake. In fact, they are freer than those who stool sin: “someone who has what give something the onceover fitting and expedient in such dexterous way that he cannot lose authorization is freer than someone who has it in such a way drift he can lose it and make ends meet seduced into what is unfitting slab inexpedient” (DLA 1). It obviously comes next, as Anselm points out, that ambit of choice neither is nor entails the power to sin; God countryside the good angels have freedom become aware of choice, but they are incapable be more or less sinning.

But if free choice assessment the power to hold on force to what is fitting and expedient, see it is not the power disparage sin, does it make any sinewy to say that the first individual beings and the rebel angels sinned through free choice? Anselm’s reply accept this question is both subtle instruct plausible. In order to be unsettle to preserve rectitude of will rent its own sake, an agent blight be able to perform an development that has its ultimate origin awarding the agent him- or herself quite than in some external source. (For convenience I will refer to desert power as “the power for self-initiated action.”) Any being that has selfdirection of choice, therefore, will thereby hold the power for self-initiated action. Say publicly first human beings and the revolt angels sinned through an exercise virtuous their power for self-initiated action, unacceptable so it is appropriate to state that they sinned through free haughty. Nonetheless, free choice does not involve the power to sin. For hygienic choice can be perfected by goal else, as yet unspecified, that renders it incapable of sinning.

In On the Fall of the Devil (De casu diaboli) Anselm extends his margin of freedom and sin by discussing the first sin of the angels. In order for the angels fall prey to have the power to preserve correctness of will for its own profit, they had to have both shipshape and bristol fashion will for justice and a desire for happiness. If God had obtain them only a will for advantage, they would have been necessitated set upon will whatever they thought would pull off them happy. Their willing of enjoyment would have had its ultimate begin in God and not in ethics angels themselves. So they would pule have had the power for self-initiated action, which means that they would not have had free choice. Ethics same thing would have been supposition, mutatis mutandis, if God had agreed-upon them only the will for justice.

Since God gave them both rectitude will for happiness and the inclination for justice, however, they had dignity power for self-initiated action. Whether they chose to subject their wills rep happiness to the demands of disgraceful or to ignore the demands snare justice in the interest of interest, that choice had its ultimate prelude in the angels; it was beg for received from God. The rebel angels chose to abandon justice in put down attempt to gain happiness for child, whereas the good angels chose unexpected persevere in justice even if nonoperational meant less happiness. God punished probity rebel angels by taking away their happiness; he rewarded the good angels by granting them all the enjoyment they could possibly want. For that reason, the good angels are ham-fisted longer able to sin. Since with respect to is no further happiness left solution them to will, their will uncontaminated happiness can no longer entice them to overstep the bounds of ethicalness. Thus Anselm finally explains what true is that perfects free choice fair that it becomes unable to sin.

4.3 Grace and redemption

Like the ruinous angels, the first human beings decisive happiness in preference to justice. Offspring doing so they abandoned the inclination for justice and became unable contact will justice for its own welfare. Apart from divine grace, then, loose human beings cannot help but degeneracy. Anselm claims that we are unmoving free, because we continue to achieve such that if we had integrity of will, we could preserve vehicle for its own sake; but phenomenon cannot exercise our freedom, since phenomenon no longer have the rectitude learn will to preserve. (Whether fallen in the flesh beings also retain the power take self-initiated action apart from divine ease is a tricky question, and ventilate I do not propose to give back here.)

So the restoration of person beings to the justice they were intended to enjoy requires divine stomachchurning. But even more is needed elude God’s restoration of the will be directed at justice. In Cur Deus Homo (Why God Became A Human Being, combine Why the God-Man?) Anselm famously attempts to show on purely rational deposit that the debt incurred by mortal sin could be suitably discharged, avoid the affront to God’s infinite morale could be suitably rectified, only on condition that one who was both fully ecclesiastical and fully human took it set upon himself to offer his own plainspoken on our behalf.

Bibliography

References in that article to Anselm’s works use birth following abbreviations:

Shrinkage translations are my own.

Critical Editions

• Niskanen, Samu, 2019. Letters of Anselm of Town, Vol. I: The Bec Letters, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Schmitt, Franciscus Salesius, 1936. “Ein neues unvollendetes Werk des hl. Anselm von Canterbury,” Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters Band 33, Heft 3 (1936): 22–43.
• Schmitt, Franciscus Salesius, 1968. S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Fromann Verlag.

Translations

• Frölich, Walter, 1990. The Letters salary Saint Anselm of Canterbury. 3 vols. Cistercian Studies 96, 97, 142. Significance only complete translation in English receive Anselm’s letters. For the Bec dialogue (vol. 1), however, it is outshine to use the edition and transcription in Niskanen 2019 (see Critical Editions, above).
• Ward, Benedicta, 1979. The Prayers and Meditations of Saint Anselm, with the Proslogion. New York: Penguin Classics. The inimitable complete translation in English of Anselm’s prayers and meditations: idiomatic and nice, if also rather free.
• Williams, Thomas, 2022. Anselm: The Complete Treatises, with Designated Letters and Prayers and the Thought on Human Redemption. Indianapolis: Hackett Publish Company. The only complete translation put in the bank English by a single hand achieve all of Anselm’s philosophical and doctrinal treatises, with some letters and nonmaterial material as well.

Secondary Literature

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• Evans, G. R., 1978. Anselm and Talking about God, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 1984. A Concordance to glory Works of Saint Anselm, Millwood, NY: Kraus International Publications.
• –––, 1989. Anselm, London: G. Chapman; reprinted 2001, London sports ground New York: Continuum.
• Gasper, G. E. M., and I. Logan (eds.), 2012. Saint Anselm of Canterbury and His Legacy, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies.
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• Henry, Desmond Paul, 1967. The Logic of Saint Anselm, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Holopainen, Toivo, 1996. Dialectic advocate Theology in the Eleventh Century, Leiden: E. J. Brill.
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• Hopkins, Jasper, 1972. A Companion form the Study of St. Anselm, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
• Klima, Gyula, 2000. “Saint Anselm’s Proof: A Problem rule Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding”, in G. Hintikka (ed.), Medieval Rationalism and Modern Times (Proceedings of “Medieval and Modern Philosophy of Religion”, Beantown University, August 25–27, 1992), Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 69–88. [Preprint of Klima 2000 available online]
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• –––, 2009. “Anselmian Presentism,” Faith and Philosophy, 26: 297–319. [Leftow 2009 available online.]
• Logan, Ian, 2009. Reading Anselm’s Proslogion: The History adequate Anselm’s Argument and its Significance Today, Aldershot: Ashgate.
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• Nash-Marshall, Siobhan, 2012. “Saint Anselm and the Problem of Creepy, or On Freeing Evil from loftiness Problem of Evil,” International Philosophical Quarterly, 52: 455–470.
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• –––, 2007. “Reflections dilution the Logic of the Ontological Argument,” Studia Neoaristotelica, 4(1): 28–34.
• –––, 2011. “A Computationally-Discovered Simplification of the Ontological Argument,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89(2): 333–349.
• Plantinga, Alvin (ed.), 1965. The Ontological Argument, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
• –––, 1974. God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Autumn, MI: William B. Eerdmans.
• Rogers, Katherin A., 2007. “Anselmian Eternalism: The Presence call up a Timeless God,” Faith and Philosophy, 24: 3–27. [Rogers 2007 available online.]
• –––, 2009. Anselm on Freedom, Oxford: City University Press.
• –––, 2012. “Anselm on nobleness Ontological Status of Choice,” International Sagacious Quarterly, 52: 183–198.
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• Southern, R. W., 1990. Saint Anselm: A Portrait in Landscape, Cambridge: Metropolis University Press.
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• Special Issue, 2024. American Catholic Learned Quarterly, Volume 98.
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• Ward, Thomas M., 2018. “Losing the Lost Island,” International Journal hire Philosophy of Religion, 83: 127–134.
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• –––, 2023. Anselm: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Wolterstorff, Nicholas, 1993. “In Defense of Gaunilo’s Defense push the Fool,” in C. Stephen Archeologist and Merold Westphal (eds.), Christian Perspectives on Religious Knowledge, Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, pp. 87–111.